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SHARE AND SHARE DISLIKE:
THE RISE OF UBER AND AIRBNB AND HOW
NEW YORK CITY SHOULD PLAY NICE
Alexandra Jonas*
Uber and Airbnb are two companies in the emerging “sharing
economy” that provide individuals with a means to become
entrepreneurs and benefit from a laissez-faire business model. The
problem, however, is that while the benefits to users are great, so
too are the risks. The dangers of operating without restraint and
circumventing existing law are not only potentially harmful to
unapprised users, but also adversely affect the continued use of
these businesses. Every aggrieved user complaint has the potential
for a lawsuit and every violation creates an opportunity for
penalties. Left over are attempts by the courts and city government
to remedy these issues. Since New Yorkers will continue to utilize
these services, the legislature should respond by implementing new
and unique regulations with which sharing economy businesses
must comply.
* J.D. Candidate, Brooklyn Law School 2016; B.B.A., Pace University 2012. I
would like to thank the Journal of Law and Policy executive board for their hard
work and edits, and my family and those who give me enduring love and
support.
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INTRODUCTION
“There are laws for people and there are laws for business,
but you are a new category, a third category,
people as businesses.”1
Humans have always found unconventional ways to share.2 In
Ancient Rome, citizens opened their private homes to the public so
that nearly all Roman citizens could bathe for a small fee.3 Those
who could not construct their own baths, or who could not afford
the most regal, could instead visit the local village baths to wash,
rest, and unite with other Romans.4 Opening private baths to the
public provided extra wealth to the Romans offering the service,
and convenience to those who frequented the baths.5
Today, most people still do as the Romans do. The “sharing
economy” has revived this ancient notion of sharing6 through its
system where necessity and new technologies permit people to
create innovative ways of offering food, jobs, housing, goods, and
transportation for themselves and others. Platforms that connect
supply and demand at the peer-to-peer level allow practices such as
car sharing, ridesharing, apartment sharing, cooperatives,
community farms, shared housing, shared workspaces, and a
1 David Streitfeld, Companies Built on Sharing Balk When It Comes to
Regulators, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/22/
business/companies-built-on-sharing-balk-when-it-comes-to-regulators.html?_r
=0.
2 Barbara F. McManus, Roman Baths and Bathing, VROMA (June 2011),
http://www.vroma.org/~bmcmanus/baths.html.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 There are other terms used to refer to the sharing economy such as
“collaborative consumption” and “peer-to-peer (P2P) exchange.” Benita
Matofska, What is the Sharing Economy?, PEOPLE WHO SHARE, http://www.the
peoplewhoshare.com/blog/what-is-the-sharing-economy (last visited Oct. 2,
2015).
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multitude of new enterprises.7 The system essentially enables
people to utilize an item or service without obtaining any
ownership.8
Although modern associations with the word “sharing”
typically involve non-monetary swaps,9 this contemporary system
of sharing promotes just the opposite––renting and lending for
mutual gain.10 Indeed, the sharing economy is a “system of direct
exchange of goods and services among individuals.”11 The Internet
provides access to these exchanges and permits billions of people
around the world to connect.12 Technological platforms allow
individuals globally to do business, one-on-one, in a collaborative
fashion.13 The sharing economy gives newly empowered users
access to an array of goods and services offered directly by people
just like themselves, and the ability to interact with members of
their communities and of communities in near or faraway places.14
People can “rent items and services from other individuals instead
7 SUSTAINABLE ECONS. LAW CTR., POLICIES FOR SHAREABLE CITIES: A
SHARING ECONOMY POLICY PRIMER FOR URBAN LEADERS 6 (2013),
http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net/theselc/pages/209/attachments/original/1
394836950/policies_for_shareable_cities_selc_9_9_13.pdf?1394836950.
8 RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS: THE RISE
OFCOLLABORATIVECONSUMPTION 71 (2010).
9 Colleen Walsh, The Big Share, HARVARD GAZETTE (Aug. 5, 2014),
http://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2014/08/the-big-share/.
10 The Romans had to pay for sharing baths, so this idea of paying for
sharing resources is not “new”—it simply has been revitalized. See McManus,
supra note 2.
11 Walsh, supra note 9.
12 Id.
13 Claire Cain Miller, When Uber and Airbnb Meet the Real World, N.Y.
TIMES: THE UPSHOTS (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/19/
upshot/when-uber-lyft-and-airbnb-meet-the-real-world.html (“The first principle
is to be a middleman . . . . As platforms, the thinking goes, [the companies] are
just connectors, with no responsibility for what happens there.”).
14 See Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating
Innovation in the Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI & TECH. 413, 416–17,
428 (2015).
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of [from] established businesses.”15 Access is the form of
ownership.16
Thousands of new technology companies have created the
platforms to facilitate these interchanges.17 Companies like Uber
and Airbnb allow people to arrange travel accommodations by
interfacing with others online.18 Individuals can log into Uber to
request a ride to their destinations and experience convenience,
comfort, and ease of transport that is at least equal to the price they
pay for the ride.19 Similarly for Airbnb, interested travelers have
the opportunity to visit the place of their dreams, without having to
pay exorbitant prices for hotels, or having to settle for a hostel or
other inexpensive, but perhaps undesirable, alternative.20 In
essence, drivers and hosts can earn extra income by using their
personal vehicles or properties to offer services to the public.21
This system of trust is on the rise as more users continue to join the
brigade.
While the sharing economy has risen with fervency, so too has
the fight against government regulation.22 Regulating the sharing
economy is challenging because it is not clear where these new
15 Amit Peri, The Sharing Economy: Shaking up Europe, Unifying the U.S.,
GEEK TIME (Sept. 28, 2014), http://www.geektime.com/2014/09/28/the-sharing-
economy-shaking-up-europe-while-unifying-the-u-s/.
16 Ranchordás, supra note 14, at 416.
17 Lisa Gerstner, Cash In on the Sharing Economy, KIPLINGER (July 2014),
http://www.kiplinger.com/article/business/T049-C000-S002-cash-in-on-the-sha
ring-economy.html (explaining that there are nearly 5000 sharing companies
that are projected to generate billions of dollars in revenue in 2014); Molly
Cohen & Corey Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing
Economy, 58 BOS. B.J. 34, 34 (2014).
18 Roberta A. Kaplan, Perspective, Regulation and the Sharing Economy,
252 N.Y.L.J. 6, 7 (2014).
19 Walsh, supra note 9.
20 See id.
21 Gerstner, supra note 17.
22 Ranchordás, supra note 14, at 420 (“Sharing economy practices
challenge regulations on a daily basis, evidencing the tension between the need
to encourage innovation and the need to protect customers from fraud and
liability and practices that might endanger public health or safety. In the world
of sharing economy, traditional legal boundaries are easily blurred, resulting in
legal gray areas and regulatory uncertainty.” (footnote omitted)).
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businesses lie in relation to existing laws.23 These types of
companies do not fit industry regulations perfectly, and they
therefore tend to operate outside of the law.24 Critics of the sharing
economy, such as yellow taxicab drivers, landlords, and hotel
owners, “argue that operating without regulation gives start-ups an
unfair advantage over highly regulated incumbents.”25 The sharing
economy also creates a potential for unregulated misconduct.26 A
few cities have thus aimed to squeeze these businesses into
existing regulations, but most attempts have proved unworkable.27
“Because the threat of enforcement actions can have a chilling
effect on start-ups and their users, state and local government
officials . . . should encourage the growth of the sharing economy”
by implementing new regulations.28 Cities that are prepared to
welcome “regulatory innovation may thrive”29 while cities that do
not will lag just as the law has in governing them.30
This Note focuses on the two major players in the sharing
economy: Uber and Airbnb. It argues that the sharing economy
does not pose a new problem in the world of innovation versus
23 Id.
24 Alexandra Chang, Regulation Won’t Kill the Sharing Economy. We Just
Need New Rules, POPULAR SCI. (July 8, 2014,), http://www.popsci.
com/article/technology/regulation-wont-kill-sharing-economy-we-just-need-
new-rules.
25 Id.
26 Id. (“[P]olicies that govern taxi and limo services ensure drivers are well
insured and cannot discriminate based on neighborhood, gender, race, or
disability.”); see also Editorial, The Dark Side of the Sharing Economy, N.Y.
TIMES (Apr. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/05/01/opinion/the-dark-
side-of-the-sharing-economy.html (“There are good reasons that governments
regulate housing. For example, officials use zoning laws to separate hotels and
residential development so apartment buildings are not overrun by tourists. Rent
control policies exist to help ensure that lower-income tenants have a place to
live. Laws against short-term rentals make sure landlords do not operate illegal
hotels and reduce the number of apartments available to permanent residents.”).
27 These businesses are not “taxi” or “hotel” companies. They fall into their
own category. Ranchordás, supra note 14, at 420.
28 Kaplan, supra note 18.
29 Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 17.
30 See Kaplan, supra note 18 (“[O]verregulation and over-litigation for the
sake of incumbent competitors’ short-term, parochial interests may stifle the
‘sharing economy’ and deprive the public of its obvious benefits.”).
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regulation, but instead showcases a modern version of a traditional
sharing concept that must find its place in the legal system. This
Note examines specifically the laws that regulate the New York
City taxicab, hotel, and housing industries to demonstrate their
inability to adequately regulate the sharing economy. This Note
emphasizes that the attempt to squeeze these companies into
existing regulations is a poor and temporary solution. This Note
reasons that rather than dismissing the presence of these companies
in New York City and maintaining a multiplicity of lawsuits and
fines imposed on both the companies and uninformed users, the
city should instead develop sharing economy-specific regulations
that monitor the new companies and protect users and the
incumbent industries. Finally, this Note argues that Uber, Airbnb,
and companies like them will continue to aggravate the taxicab and
hotel industry if New York City fails to enact new laws.31
I. YELLOWNOMORE: THEDEATH OF THE TAXIMEDALLION?
A. History of the New York City Medallion System and
Taxi Regulations
The yellow taxicab is a highly recognized icon of New York
City.32 One of the first taxicab companies was the Electric Carriage
and Wagon Company, which started a fleet of electric taxis in July
1897.33 People slowly began to forego the trolley car and street rail
systems for the more personalized driver-operated experience.34
The new system promised convenience and affordability, and so
New Yorkers accepted innovation.35 But as the prevalence of taxi
companies grew, so did the need for regulation.36 The push for
31 Billy Hamilton, Tax Trouble for the ‘Sharing Economy,’ 72 ST. TAX
NOTES 475 (2014) (“The sharing companies’ business model may make them
successful, but it shouldn’t excuse them from the same public responsibilities as
other businesses.”).
32 GRAHAM RUSSELLGAOHODGES, TAXI!: A SOCIALHISTORY OF THENEW
YORKCITY CABDRIVER 40–41 (Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2007).
33 Id. at 11–12.
34 Id.
35 Id.
36 Id. at 35.
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government oversight emerged during the Great Depression as the
lack of fares created tremendous competition among taxi drivers.37
Disgruntled cabdrivers turned their anger into violent protest,38 and
neither the police nor the taxi commissions could stop them.39
The New York City Board of Aldermen eventually proposed
the Haas Act of 1937,40 which limited the number of medallions41
for all yellow cabs to 13,595 and fixed the number of medallions
that it could issue.42 On May 11, 1937, the New York State
Supreme Court upheld the Act and ruled that the police had the
right to limit the number of cabs in New York City.43 Since only a
limited number of taxis were then able to operate, the ratio of taxis
to people decreased and the backseats of most cabs were once
again full.44 Despite the improvement, however, this state of
37 Trent Warner, Taxi Timeline: The History of Taxis in New York City,
ALL ISLAND TRANSP. (May 6, 2014, 11:41 AM), http://allislandtransportation.
com/taxi-timeline-history-taxis-new-york-city/ (explaining that there were many
taxis on the road, but hardly any passengers to pick up since people could not
afford to pay for taxis during the Great Depression).
38 Regulations and Prosperity: 1935–1960, TAXI OF TOMORROW,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/media/totweb/taxioftomorrow_history_regulationandp
ropserity.html (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) [hereinafter Regulations and
Prosperity].
39 Warner, supra note 37.
40 Regulations and Prosperity, supra note 38.
41 MICHAEL R. BLOOMBERG & DAVID YASSKY, 2014 TAXICAB FACTBOOK
12 (2014), http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/downloads/pdf/2014_taxicab_fact_book
.pdf (“Medallions are small metal plates attached to the hood of a taxi, certifying
it for passenger pick-up throughout the city. Yellow taxicabs with medallions
are the only vehicles authorized to pick up passengers by street hail anywhere in
New York City . . . . As of now, there are 13,437 total taxi medallions in New
York City.”). In response to the need for pre-arranged vehicle service, the Taxi
& Limousine Commission permits liveries (or for-hire vehicles) to arrange
prearranged trips. See id. at 2. Street hailing of these vehicles (usually black
cars) is not permitted, and the vehicles must be affiliated with a base station in
one of the five boroughs. Id. The demand for for-hire vehicles was sparked by
corporate clients’ needs to be picked up from work at late hours. Id.
42 HODGES, supra note 32, at 11–17.
43 Id.
44 HODGES, supra note 32, at 77; see also Aaron Sankin, Why New York
Taxis Are Powerless Against Uber’s Price War, DAILY DOT (July 8, 2014, 4:08
PM), http://www.dailydot.com/technology/uber-nyc-taxi-cheaper-price-war/
(“Artificially constricting the supply of cabs girded against flooding the market
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prosperity and cooperation did not last long. There was soon more
demand than supply––and the city needed more taxis.45
As a result, cab companies began charging exorbitant fares.46
Drivers could effectively turn down low-paying customers in order
to pick up only the wealthy.47 Standardized rates were the primary
form of city-wide regulation of the taxi industry, providing
consumers protection from exploitative pricing.48 Meanwhile,
sustained demand for transportation spurred a continued rise in
medallion prices.49 Although today the medallion system does
respond to the need for taxicab service, it also heavily codifies the
ownership and use of yellow taxicabs in New York City.50
Numerous regulations govern medallion taxicab services.51 The
city strictly limits the number of yellow taxicabs that are allowed
to operate,52 and further dictates the amount of hours a driver must
work,53 the flat rate that passengers must pay,54 licensing fees,55
inspection fees,56 maintenance and record-keeping requirements,57
with operators and ensured drivers a consistent income. It also gave
municipalities the ability to easily and effectively impose safety and consumer
protection regulations, like insurance requirements, background checks for
operators, and requirements that drivers drop people off anywhere within city
limits that they want to go.”).
45 See HODGES, supra note 32, at 77.
46 Id. at 79; Sankin, supra note 44.
47 See Sankin, supra note 44.
48 HODGES, supra note 32, at 86–87.
49 Felix Salmon, Why Taxi Medallions Cost $1 Million, REUTERS (Oct. 21,
2011), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2011/10/21/why-taxi-medallions-co
st-1-million; see also HODGES, supra note 32, at 66–67 (explaining that taxi
medallions cost $10 in the early 1900s and upwards of $1,000,000 today).
50 N.Y.C., R.C.N.Y. tit. 35, § 58 (2015). There are other car services in
New York City, such as for-hire vehicle services, which allow passengers to
arrange pick-ups. These services operate under different rules than the yellow
cab services. BLOOMBERG&YASSKY, supra note 41, at 2.
51 See N.Y.C., R.C.N.Y. tit. 35, § 58.
52 BLOOMBERG&YASSKY, supra note 41, at 1.
53 R.C.N.Y. § 58-20.
54 Id. § 58-26.
55 Id. § 58-07.
56 Id. §§ 58-07(d)–(e).
57 Id. § 58-24.
THE RISE OF UBER AND AIRBNB 213
workers’ compensation rules,58 public accommodation laws,59 and
vehicle and equipment inspection demands.60 These rules apply to
both the medallion owner and the drivers.61 According to the New
York City Taxi & Limousine Commission (“TLC”), the laws are
meant to respond to the “the need for intelligent regulation to set
the rules of competition, ensure safety, [and] provide transparency
to market participants.”62 Even though these stipulations do
provide safeguards for commuters, drivers, and medallion holders,
they also create high entry barriers to the New York City taxi
market.63 This, however, has not stopped Uber.
B. What is Uber?
A pioneer in the sharing economy, Uber is one of many ride
service companies that allows passengers to request rides from
private vehicles operated by drivers who utilize its mobile
application.64 Users download the Uber application on their
devices, set a pickup location, request a ride, wait for a driver to
58 Id. § 58-14.
59 What the Law Covers, N.Y.C. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/html/coverage/law-coverage.shtml (last visited
Oct. 2, 2015) (listing “taxi cabs” as “public accommodations” covered by the
anti-discrimination provisions of the N.Y.C. Human Rights Law).
60 R.C.N.Y § 58-29–42.
61 See generally R.C.N.Y § 58 (imposing duties on medallion owners as
well as drivers). Typically, most drivers lease the vehicle from medallion
holders, making medallion holders liable for actions of drivers. However, both
drivers and medallion holders must comply with local rules. R.C.N.Y § 58-13
(mandating all medallion owners maintain liability insurance for taxis driven
under their medallion number); see BLOOMBERG & YASSKY, supra note 41, at
12 (explaining how independent and institutional medallion holders lease their
medallions).
62 TLC Mission Statement, N.Y.C. TAXI & LIMOUSINE COMMISSION,
http://www.nyc.gov/html/tlc/html/about/mission.shtml (last visited Oct. 2,
2015).
63 See Lisa Rayle, et al., App-Based, On-Demand Ride Services:
Comparing Taxi and Ridesourcing Trips and User Characteristics in San
Francisco (Univ. of Cal. Transp. Ctr., Working Paper No. 8, 2014).
64 Id. at 2–3. Uber’s biggest competitor is Lyft, which allows passengers to
connect with ordinary people who use their cars to drive users from point A to
point B. Lyft drivers are non-commercially licensed. Id. at 3.
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accept, enter the address or name of the destination, and anticipate
the driver’s arrival.65 The app then calculates a “fare quote,” which
passengers pay via the application.66 Since it is not currently
subject to the same rate regulations that constrain the taxi industry,
Uber may charge higher prices during peak hours and holidays.67
Moreover, Uber permits drivers to use their personal vehicles to
pick up passengers, making Uber-driving more accessible than
taxicab ownership.68
Uber liberates taxi operators across the world with its very
limited criteria to become a driver.69 An interested driver need only
confirm that Uber operates in his city and fill out a few
documents.70 When Uber arrives in a new city, its drivers are
usually not covered by existing codes or rules.71 Uber promulgates
65 Maya Kosoff, Here’s How to Use Uber, the Incredibly Easy App That
Could Change Your Life, BUS. INSIDER (Aug. 25, 2014, 11:04 AM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/how-to-use-uber-2014-8?op=1.
66 UBER, https://www.uber.com/features (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
67 E.g., compare N.Y.C., R.C.N.Y. tit. 35, § 58-26 (2015) (setting
standardized rates for medallion taxis) with Letter from Eric T. Schneiderman,
Attorney Gen. for N.Y., to Travis Kalanick, Co-Founder & C.E.O., Uber
Technologies Inc. (July 8, 2014), http://ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Uber_Letter_Agree
ment.pdf (agreeing to limit surge pricing during statutorily defined “abnormal
disruptions of the market”) [hereinafter Schneiderman Letter]. Many states have
price gouging laws, which establish an outer bound on Uber’s demand-based
pricing mechanism. Dan Kedmey, This Is How Uber’s ‘Surge Pricing’ Works,
TIME (Dec. 15, 2014), http://time.com/3633469/uber-surge-pricing/.
68 In fact, Uber informs all prospective drivers that the company does not
own any vehicles, so they must supply their own. E.g., UberX/XL, UBERMINN.,
http://uberminnesota.com/mspuberxxl/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (“Uber does
not own any vehicles. If you’d like to partner with Uber, you will need your own
vehicle.”); Vehicle Requirements, DRIVE UBER NYC, http://www.driveubernyc.
com/cars/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2015) (“Uber doesn’t own any vehicles, so if you
want to partner with us you’ll need to find yourself a vehicle.”).
69 Driving Jobs vs Driving With Uber, UBER, https://www.uber.com/driver-
jobs (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
70 See id.
71 Conor Dougherty & Mike Isaac, Uber to Portland: We’re Here. Deal
With It., N.Y. TIMES: BITS (Dec. 5, 2014, 11:01 PM),
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/12/05/uber-to-portland-were-here-deal-with-
it/?_r=0 (“That devil-may-care approach to dealing with city officials – entering
a city without permission and dealing with regulatory issues after its services are
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“Terms and Conditions,” which can be accessed on its website or
through the mobile application.72 Both passengers and drivers must
adhere to these terms, with passengers referred to as “users” and
drivers referred to as “third party providers.”73 Uber subjects
drivers and passengers to many of the same regulations,
demonstrating that both parties are on similar footing in any
“sharing” transaction and rendering Uber free from nearly all
liabilities that would typically apply to drivers and travelers.74
Uber’s limited involvement in each ride transaction provides
drivers and passengers with the peer-to-peer exchange upon which
the sharing economy bases its entire model.75
Due to this ease of use, new drivers76 and passengers across the
world have welcomed Uber with open arms. Passengers applaud
the easy access to this service.77 Drivers who are unable to
purchase or lease a medallion now have the option to use Uber to
obtain or supplement their income.78 Not all people, however, have
well established and locals are already hooked – has become a hallmark of
Uber’s strategy.”).
72 Legal: Terms and Conditions, UBER (Jan. 2, 2016),
https://www.uber.com/en-US/legal/usa/terms (listing the terms of service for
using Uber).
73 See id.
74 See id. (“You agree to indemnify and hold Uber and its officers,
directors, employees, and agents harmless from any and all claims, demands,
losses, liabilities, and expenses (including attorneys’ fees), arising out of or in
connection with: (i) your use of the Services or services or goods obtained
through your use of the Services; (ii) your breach or violation of any of these
Terms; (iii) Uber’s use of your User Content; or (iv) your violation of the rights
of any third party, including Third Party Providers.”).
75 SeeWalsh, supra note 9.
76 The term “new drivers” refers here to those drivers who were not driving
traditional taxicabs prior to becoming drivers through Uber.
77 See Rayle, supra note 63, at 2 (“Passengers request a ride from a private
passenger vehicle driven by a (usually) non-commercially licensed driver
through the mobile application, which then communicates the passenger’s
location via GPS . . . . A passenger’s credit card information can be saved within
the system to facilitate future trips.”).
78 Tomio Geron, Sharing Economy Provides Extra Cash and Creative
Expression, FORBES (Sept. 9, 2013, 3:29 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/tomiogeron/2013/03/09/sharing-economy-provides-extra-cash-and-creative
-expression-sxsw/#2a20c8e22102.
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met Uber with such praise. Taxi unions and drivers globally have
ignited riots and strikes in response to Uber’s growth.79 Further,
many cities have found that Uber violates numerous local laws and
have prohibited its presence within their jurisdictions.80 Cities must
now decide whether and to what extent they will ban this business
and others like it.81
79 Lauren Frayer, Uber, Airbnb Under Attack in Spain As Old and New
Economies Clash, NPR (July 29, 2014, 4:55 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/
parallels/2014/07/29/327796899/uber-airbnb-under-attack-in-spain-as-old-and-
new-economy-clash (“Taxi drivers protest against Uber, an on-demand car
service app, during a 24-hour strike July 1 in Barcelona, Spain. They say it
undercuts their business and are calling for the government to ban it.”). Lori
Hinnant, Taxi Strike Brings France to Standstill Amid Growing Rage Against
Uber, HUFFINGTON POST (June 25, 2015, 9:42 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost
.com/2015/06/25/france-taxi-strike-uber_n_7662048.html (“French taxis went
on a nationwide strike Thursday, snarling traffic in major cities after weeks of
rising, sometimes violent tensions over Uber.”).
80 Peter Diamandis, Uber vs. the Law (My Money’s On Uber), FORBES
(Sept. 8, 2014, 3:34 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/peterdiamandis/2014/09
/08/uber-vs-the-law-my-moneys-on-uber/#447201471fd8 (“German[] officials
just slapped a nationwide ban on Uber because the drivers don’t have correct
permits. Drivers will face fines of up to $323,7000 per trip if Uber violates this
temporary injunction.”).
81 Ian Mount, Airbnb, Uber Under Attack in Barcelona, FORTUNE MAG.
(May 28, 2014, 10:20 AM), http://fortune.com/2014/05/28/airbnb-uber-
barcelona/ (“Barcelona has become a headache for the popular residence and
ride-sharing platforms [Airbnb and Uber], ground zero in a fight over how
collaborative consumption should be regulated and taxed. Taxi drivers have
asked Barcelona’s local government to shut down Uber because of what they see
as unfair competition from unlicensed, untaxed drivers. Hotel unions have made
similar complaints about Airbnb, and local residents have objected to the
proliferation of unlicensed tourist apartments.”).
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II. I WANT TOWAKEUP IN A CITY THATDOESN’T SLEEP: IN A
STRANGER’SAPARTMENT?
A. Development of Hotel Industry Regulations and Effects
on Housing
New York City has a long history of providing hotel
accommodations to transient visitors.82 Indeed, the first modern
hotel graced the city in 1794 when the City Hotel opened.83 The
popularity of hotels grew and within years, hotels across the city
offered amenities such as private baths and ice water.84 Other
amenities included large public rooms and rooftop gardens.85 New
Yorkers and tourists alike were very receptive to the hotel
industry’s rise.86 As a result, New York City was forced to regulate
its hotel industry.
In 1909, the New York City legislature enacted Article 12 of
the General Business Law, which set forth regulations for hotels.87
Since then, hotels operating in New York City have had to abide
by a set of rules that protect hotel owners, staff, and guests.88
Article 12 provides a safeguard against issues such as equal rights
in places of public accommodation, theft of goods and services,
sanitation, fire, fraudulent advertising, disposition of proceeds of
sales, and registration of travelers’ names.89 The law further
restricts the types of buildings that can operate as hotels, and
emphasizes that such buildings must be designed and registered for
that commercial purpose.90
82 See Jessica Dailey, Remembering NYC’s Grandest Forgotten Hotels,
CURBED N.Y. (Jun. 26, 2013), http://ny.curbed.com/2013/6/26/10227158
/remembering-nycs-grandest-forgotten-hotels-in-photos.
83 EDWIN G. BURROWS & MIKE WALLACE, GOTHAM: A HISTORY OF NEW
YORKCITY TO 1898, at 340 (1998).
84 Dailey, supra note 82.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW ch. 20, Art. 12 (McKinney 2015) (enacted Feb. 7,
1909).
88 Id. §§ 200–209.
89 Id.
90 Id. § 209-a.
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As a consequence of this regulatory regime, many illegal hotels
opened throughout Manhattan.91 City residents who wanted to
make additional income began operating their dwellings as
“hotels” and renting out both entire apartments and individual
rooms for short-term periods.92 In 2010, New York amended its
Multiple Dwelling Law to combat the illegal hotel problem.93 The
law had presented new problems for the city as it affected
individual owners’ ability to rent out extra space in their
apartments.94 Legislators therefore amended the law to state that
“illegal hotel activity” occurs “[w]hen permanent residential
apartments in buildings with three units or more are rented out for
less than thirty days to transient visitors instead of residents.”95
The law permits a class of rentals to provide city residents with an
additional source of income.96 The law also ensures that illegal
hotels do not worsen New York City’s housing shortage––as many
landlords evict existing tenants to make more money by charging
travelers hotel rates.97 Moreover, the law seeks to prevent strangers
from entering private residential buildings.98 Airbnb, however,
circumvents this objective.
91 SeeLeg. Assemb. A7495, Introducer’s Memorandum (N.Y. 2013).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id.
95 Liz Krueger, Answers For New Yorkers Concerned Or Confused About
The Illegal Hotel Law, N.Y. ST. SENATE (May 27, 2014), http://www.nysenate.
gov/report/answers-new-yorkers-concerned-or-confused-about-illegal-hotel-law
(“The 2010 law does not apply to owners of single-family and two-family
homes, or residents who rent out individual rooms in their homes for less than
30 days (as long as they are also there the entire time).”).
96 See id.
97 Id.
98 Id. (“That can create serious quality-of-life problems and safety for
neighbors, at a minimum – sleepless nights caused by overcrowded neighboring
apartments packed with loud tourists, for example. But it can get far worse. My
office has heard of buildings burglarized and neighbors assaulted by strangers
who might never have had access to get inside, were it not for illegal hotel
activity.”).
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B. What is Airbnb?
“Airbnb is a global community marketplace that connects
travelers who seek authentic, high-quality accommodations with
hosts who offer unique places to stay.”99 Users can access the
application through their mobile devices and can connect with
others across the globe.100 Individuals list their spaces online with
photographs and descriptions to enable interested travelers to gain
insight on the property before contacting the host.101 Users can find
a place that suits their needs, “request a booking,” and wait for a
response from the host.102 Hosts set the prices through the Airbnb
site, though Airbnb provides “suggested rates” comparable to those
in their area.103 The host then accepts the user, and the user has
booked the space.104
99 Max Pomeranc, Hotels vs. Regular New Yorkers, AIRBNB: PUB. POL’Y
BLOG (Sept. 12, 2014), http://publicpolicy.airbnb.com/hotels-vs-regular-new-
yorkers/; About Us, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/about/about-us (last
visited Oct. 2, 2015) [hereinafter About Us] (“Whether an apartment for a night,
a castle for a week, or a villa for a month, Airbnb connects people to unique
travel experiences, at any price point, in more than 34,000 cities and 190
countries. And with world-class customer service and a growing community of
users, Airbnb is the easiest way for people to monetize their extra space and
showcase it to an audience of millions.”).
100 About Us, supra note 99.
101 See How to Host, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/getting-
started/how-to-host (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
102 See id. Users can choose to stay in yachts, treehouses, high-rise
apartments, and even castles. See About Us, supra note 99; Luxe Yachts,
AIRBNB: WISHLISTS, https://www.airbnb.com/wishlists/luxury-yachts (last
visited Oct. 2, 2015); Trees & Zzzs, AIRBNB: WISHLISTS,
https://www.airbnb.com/wishlists/stay-in-a-treehouse (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
Presently, there are over 1,400 castles listed on Airbnb. See About Us, supra
note 99.
103 How Much Should I Charge for My Listing?, AIRBNB: HELP,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/52/how-much-should-i-charge-for-my-
listing (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
104 How to Host, supra note 101. Presently, there are more than 40,000,000
guests in more than 34,000 cities in more than 190 countries across the world.
About Us, supra note 99.
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Airbnb’s services “break the traditional model for short-term
room rentals.”105 The company permits its users to become
transient hotel operators and guests,106 subjecting both parties to
limited protection and nearly absolving itself from liability.107 For
instance, Airbnb’s Terms of Services state:
You understand and agree that Airbnb is not a party
to any agreements entered into between hosts and
guests, nor is Airbnb a real estate broker, agent or
insurer. Airbnb has no control over the conduct of
hosts, guests and other users of the site, application
and services or any accommodations, and disclaims
all liability in this regard to the maximum extent
permitted by law.108
Airbnb’s website thus clarifies that any agreements entered into
are solely between the guest and the host and that Airbnb is not a
party thereto. To utilize this platform, all one needs to do is register
with Airbnb.109
Once a user registers, Airbnb allows him to be master of his
domain. A user is responsible for abiding by all rules, and Airbnb
defines “user conduct” as any action taken by a user that
contravenes Airbnb’s policies.110 Airbnb does not promulgate any
guidelines to protect the host or guest except for the “damage to
accommodations” provision, which permits Airbnb to make claims
under either party’s individual insurance policy for any damages or
losses.111 Moreover, the company places all tax determinations
onto the users, and states clearly that it will “not offer tax-related
105 Hamilton, supra note 31, at 476.
106 See Robert S. Cook, Jr., Finding Clarity on the Legal Definition of What
Constitutes a Hotel, REAL EST. WKLY., Dec. 31, 2008, at 20, http://www.
andersonkill.com/webpdfext/RealEstateWeekly-Dec2008.pdf (explaining that
transient hotels are buildings where occupancy is less than one month).
107 Terms of Service, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/terms (last visited
Oct. 2, 2015).
108 Id.
109 Id. Registration requires users to simply put in their e-mail and basic
contact information. Sign Up, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/signup
_login?sm=2 (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
110 Terms of Service, supra note 107.
111 Id.
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advice.”112 Although Airbnb limits its role in host-user transactions
and places considerable responsibilities on the users, many users
have nonetheless been receptive to this business model.
Proponents of the sharing economy argue that Airbnb
simplifies short-term renting. The platform quickly generates
income for residents and offers travelers inexpensive alternatives
to hotels.113 The rise of Airbnb has radically “expanded the use of
traditional apartments as transient hotel rooms.”114 Tenants and
owners realize the advantage of renting their space to transient
guests, especially in cities where rent costs are high.115 Critics,
however, “see a threat to the safety, affordability, and residential
character of local communities.”116 For this reason, some cities
have banned Airbnb entirely.117 Landlords and tenants who have
112 Id. (“You as a Host understand and agree that you are solely responsible
for (i) determining your applicable Tax reporting requirements, and (ii) the
Taxes that should be included, and for including Taxes to be collected or
obligations relating to applicable Taxes in Listings. You are also solely
responsible for remitting to the relevant authority any taxes included or received
by you.”).
113 Michael Giaquinto, Why New York Should Listen to Airbnb’s Appeal for
Taxation, 73 ST. TAX NOTES 355 (2014) (“For example, while someone looking
to spend the night in the Upper East Side of Manhattan on a Tuesday night in
June might spend somewhere around $250 for a small room in a three star hotel,
that person could also choose to stay in a private studio apartment, equipped
with kitchen essentials and free wireless internet, for $175. A traveler needing
fewer frills could sleep on someone’s couch for a significantly lower price.”);
see also The Dark Side of the Sharing Economy, supra note 26.
114 OFFICE OF N.Y. STATE ATTORNEY GEN., AIRBNB IN THE CITY 2 (2014)
[hereinafter AIRBNB IN THE CITY], http://www.ag.ny.gov/pdfs/Airbnb%20
report.pdf.
115 Alexander Lycoyannis, Airbnb: Boon or Bane for NYC Residential Real
Estate?, LAW 360 (Apr. 23, 2015, 10:47 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/
646088/airbnb-boon-or-bane-for-nyc-residential-real-estate (“For a tenant
paying the notoriously high rents and enduring the high cost of living that
characterizes New York City, renting some or all of his or her apartment to
transient guests can provide welcome financial relief. For an owner, renting an
apartment to short-term guests as opposed to tenants signing leases for one year
or longer has the potential to double—or more—the asset’s productivity.”).
116 AIRBNB IN THE CITY, supra note 114, at 2.
117 Peri, supra note 15.
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rented their spaces may face a multitude of fines.118 These issues
have arisen in cities across the world, especially New York.119
III. CURRENT ISSUES WITHUBER
A. What Kind of Vehicle?
Many cities do not require Uber drivers to acquire licenses to
operate.120 This freedom entices many interested drivers to become
Uber drivers. These drivers, however, face other legal hurdles in
the form of lawsuits. Boston Cab Dispatch v. Uber Technologies
highlighted the need to abandon existing regulatory frameworks.
The plaintiff, a taxi commission similar to that of the New York
City TLC, alleged that Uber gained an unfair competitive
advantage over traditional taxi dispatch services and license
holders by avoiding the costs and burdens of complying with
extensive regulations.121 Taxicabs in Boston must possess a license
known as a “taxicab medallion” in order to operate within the city,
and these medallions carry certain requirements and
responsibilities.122 Uber cars, however, did not need to abide by
these rules—they did not affiliate with a dispatch service, receive
regular inspections, contain partitions between drivers and
passengers, provide panic buttons, or prohibit cell phone use by
drivers.123 Additionally, according to the plaintiff, Uber neither
completed driver background checks nor complied with non-
discrimination laws with respect to passengers with handicaps.124
Because Uber operated outside of the commission’s laws, the city
could not regulate the company’s practices.
The Boston case allowed many other cab companies, non-Uber
drivers, and passengers to file claims against Uber for its failure to
118 See Ranchordás, supra note 14, at 419.
119 See id.
120 See, e.g., id. at 418.
121 Bos. Cab Dispatch, Inc. v. Uber Techs., No. 13-10769(NMG), 2014
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 42063, at *1 (D. Mass. Mar. 27, 2014).
122 Id.
123 Id. at *7.
124 Id.
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comply with existing regulations.125 In some instances the
plaintiffs prevailed while in others they did not.126 This litigation
prompted New York City to find a place for Uber within its
existing body of laws and regulations. The New York City TLC
currently requires Uber drivers to operate as for-hire vehicles.127
This means that, rather than operating under the highly regulated
medallion system, drivers must instead register their vehicles as
part of the city’s livery car system, a second form of transportation
that is less regulated in New York City.128
To comply with the livery system, Uber drivers need only
obtain a TLC for-hire vehicle license, operate a TLC licensed
black car, and carry TLC-licensed insurance.129 These lesser
requirements, however, have not solved the problem. First, only
yellow taxicabs, not liveries, are permitted to pick up street
hails.130 However, since Uber vehicles go directly to the location
that the user has put into the application, 131 Uber is in effect
picking up street hails, and thus interferes with the TLC’s
distinguishing between yellow taxicabs and liveries. Allowing
Uber to essentially pick up street hails blurs this distinction, as
125 Harrison Weber, As Uber Battles 13 Lawsuits, Cabbies & State
Agencies are Out for Blood, VENTURE BEAT (May 8, 2014, 8:54 AM)
http://venturebeat.com/2014/05/08/as-uber-battles-13-lawsuits-cabbies-state-ag
encies-are-out-for-blood/ (discussing fines faced by Uber drivers as well as
lawsuits against Uber Technologies by “passengers, traditional taxi and
limousine companies, and Uber drivers themselves”).
126 See, e.g., Mike Isaac & Natasha Singer, California Says Uber Driver Is
Employee, Not a Contractor, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 2015), http://www.nytimes.
com/2015/06/18/business/uber-contests-california-labor-ruling-that-says-drivers
-should-be-employees.html (discussing the legal victory of a California Uber
driver, awarding her “$4,152.20 in expenses and other costs for the roughly
eight weeks she worked as an Uber driver last year”).
127 BLOOMBERG & YASSKY, supra note 41, at 1–2; Get a TLC License,
DRIVE UBERNYC, http://www.driveubernyc.com/tlc/ (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
128 BLOOMBERG & YASSKY, supra note 41, at 1–2 (discussing the differing
regulations for yellow taxis and livery vehicles).
129 The TLC Process, DRIVE UBER NYC, http://www.driveubernyc.com/tlc-
process (last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
130 See BLOOMBERG&YASSKY, supra note 41, at 1–2 (explaining that only
yellow taxicabs can pick up travelers who are on the street looking for a ride,
while liveries must be telephoned in advance).
131 Kosoff, supra note 65.
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Uber is subject to the rules of the less demanding livery system
while it operates more like a yellow taxi.132 Second, as previously
stated, one of the driving forces behind taxicab regulation in New
York City was the need to monitor prices.133 The TLC requires
both liveries and yellow cabs to charge set fares.134 No such
mandate exists for Uber.135
B. Price Gouging
Unlike the yellow cab and traditional livery services, which
must abide by the TLC’s guidelines, Uber capitalizes on its
fares.136 Uber has been heavily criticized for its “surge pricing”
policy during holidays, power failures, and extraordinary weather
conditions.137 Uber’s pricing system is described as “dynamic.”138
The company “does not set a single, fixed price for rides,” and
permits rates to “rise and fall as demand increases and
decreases.”139 For example, during Hurricane Sandy in 2012, Uber
multiplied fares for even short rides, simply because of torrential
weather conditions.140 The public’s adverse response was
telling.141
In response to public outcry, Eric T. Schneiderman, New
York’s Attorney General, began investigating Uber’s pricing
model and found that it may have violated General Business Law
132 See BLOOMBERG&YASSKY, supra note 41, at 1–2.
133 See id.
134 See id.
135 The TLC Process, supra note 129.
136 Ranchordás, supra note 14, at 463.
137 See Schneiderman Letter, supra note 67.
138 Thomas A. Dickerson & Sylvia O. Hinds-Radix, Apartment and Car
Sharing: A Disruptive Internet Revolution, 252 N.Y. L.J. 4 (2014).
139 Id.
140 Mike Isaac, Uber Reaches Deal with New York on Surge Pricing in
Emergencies, N.Y. TIMES: BITS (July 8, 2014), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/
2014/07/08/uber-reaches-agreement-with-n-y-on-surge-pricing-during-
emergencies/.
141 Nicholas Carlson, How A Sandy-Related PR Nightmare Cost Startup
Uber $100,000 In A Day, BUSINESS INSIDER, (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.
businessinsider.com/how-sandy-related-pr-nightmare-cost-startup-uber-100000-
in-a-day-2012-11.
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§396-r, which prevents price gouging during any “abnormal
disruption of the market.”142 Uber responded to Attorney General
Schneiderman by agreeing to “cap” its surge pricing at a certain
level.143 The company, however, can still increase its fares as long
as rates are a multiple of the base fare charged, a seemingly
arbitrary number.144 Consequently, Uber can currently implement
surge pricing up to nine hundred percent.145 Simply put, Uber may
charge a “dynamic rate” of up to nine hundred percent more than
its average price.146 The issue of fair fares is thus still unresolved.
IV. CURRENT ISSUESWITH AIRBNB
A. New York’s Multiple Dwelling Law
In New York City, many uninformed Airbnb hosts currently
rent out apartments in violation of New York’s Multiple Dwelling
Law.147 Indeed, New York City alleged violations against Nigel
Warren, totaling more than $40,000, for renting out his apartment
for less than thirty days.148 Warren, however, was absolved from
paying the fine since one of his roommates was home during the
guest’s stay.149 Since the Multiple Dwelling Law is not violated
when the tenant is home or when only a portion of the residence is
rented out, the result would not have been the same had his
142 Dickerson & Hinds-Radix, supra note 138.
143 Isaac, supra note 140.
144 Schneiderman Letter, supra note 67.
145 Erin Durkin, Councilman Proposes Law to Rein in Uber’s Surge
Pricing, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, (Nov. 25, 2014, 12:56 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/bill-rein-uber-surge-pricing-
blog-entry-1.2023317.
146 See id.
147 Hamilton, supra note 31.
148 Ron Lieber, A Warning for Hosts of Airbnb Travelers, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 30, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/01/your-money/a-warning-
for-airbnb-hosts-who-may-be-breaking-the-law.html.
149 Press Release, Senator Liz Krueger, Statement on Appeals Board
Decision in the Nigel Warren Short-Term Rental Case (Oct. 1, 2013),
http://www.nysenate.gov/press-release/statement-appeals-board-decision-nigel-
warren-short-term-rental-case.
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roommate not been home for the “entire time,” or if the guest had
occupied the entire apartment rather than only one room.150
City of New York v. Smart Apts. LLC first demonstrated
enforcement of the law as applied to the sharing economy
setting.151 There, the New York State Supreme Court enjoined
Smart Apartments from advertising, contracting, and allowing
transient occupancy in buildings where the Multiple Dwelling Law
prohibited such occupancy.152 The City argued that the company’s
business practices153 directly contravened the Multiple Dwelling
Law because the company permitted stays of less than thirty days
in residential buildings.154 Moreover, the City claimed that the
company “[d]epleted the stock of affordable, long-term housing”
by permitting short-term stays.155 The City further asserted that
Smart Apartments amplified security risks and quality-of-life
problems because the company denied occupants the proper fire
and safety precautions156 and disturbed existing residents.157 The
City claimed that the transient occupants “host loud, late night
parties; vomit, dump garbage, and smoke in the hallways; damage
the elevators with all those bulky suitcases; and generally do not
conduct themselves in the civilized, genteel manner of the
locals.”158 Another concern for the City was that the company’s
users were unaware that transient occupancy is both illegal and
unsafe.159
150 Id.
151 City of N.Y. v. Smart Apts. LLC, 959 N.Y.S.2d 890 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2013).
152 Id. at 891.
153 The company’s business model is nearly identical to that of Airbnb. Id.
at 891–92.
154 Id. at 892.
155 Id.
156 Id. (explaining that the New York City Fire and Building Codes require
transient residences to utilize significantly higher fire safety standards than non-
transient residences).
157 Id.
158 Id.
159 Id.
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Airbnb only provides minimal disclosure of pertinent city
regulations.160 The company simply notes on its website that
“some cities have laws that restrict your ability to host paying
guests for short periods.”161 This vague and subtle disclaimer has
proven ineffective in warning users of the possible consequences
that can arise from not complying with the law.162 What is more,
rather than targeting the company directly, as it did in Smart Apts.,
the City has instead scrutinized Airbnb’s unapprised users.163
Early in 2014 Attorney General Schneiderman issued to Airbnb
an investigatory subpoena seeking information regarding Airbnb’s
hosts.164 The Attorney General primarily focused on gathering data
about individuals who rent out their homes while they are absent
for long periods of time.165 He also sought material on landlords
who evict tenants and “essentially turn their units into full-time
Airbnb hotels.”166 To these ends, Attorney General Schneiderman
demanded private information that Airbnb subsequently
released.167 The Office of the Attorney General found that most
short-term rentals booked in New York City violated the Multiple
Dwelling Law, that residences that operated as transient hotels
breached fire and safety codes, and that private short-term rentals
160 See What Legal and Regulatory Issues Should I Consider Before
Hosting on Airbnb?, AIRBNB: HELP, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/376
(last visited Oct. 2, 2015).
161 See id. (“These rules can be confusing. We are working with
governments around the world to clarify these rules so that everyone has a clear
understanding of what the laws are.”).
162 See Lieber, supra note 148.
163 Id.; see also Chris Dolmetsch, New York Sues Smart Apartments Over
Hotel Conversions, BLOOMBERG BUS. (Oct. 23, 2012, 5:33 PM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/articles/2012-10-23/nyc-sues-smart-apartments-on-claims
-of-deceptive-trade-practices.
164 AIRBNB IN THECITY, supra note 114, at 4.
165 Tomio Geron, New York State AG Seeks Airbnb Data on Hosts in Legal
Battle, FORBES (July 10, 2013, 5:11 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomio
geron/2013/10/07/new-york-state-ag-seeks-airbnb-data-on-hosts-in-legal-battle/
(explaining that the Attorney General sought information about individuals who
rent out their homes for a majority of the year without living there).
166 Id.
167 AIRBNB IN THECITY, supra note 114, at 4; Geron, supra note 165.
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displaced long-term housing in thousands of apartments.168 Indeed,
widespread short-term rentals effectuate decreases in existing
tenants’ quality-of-life expectations.169 Unfamiliar transient
occupants also arguably alter the building environment,
heightening the risk of safety hazards.170 Airbnb, however,
continues to operate despite these violations.
B. Hotel Occupancy Tax
Not only has Airbnb violated New York’s Multiple Dwelling
Law, it has also arguably forgone many hotel and occupancy
taxes.171 Attorney General Schneiderman estimated that the city
has missed out on $33 million as a result of Airbnb’s users’ failure
to pay city-imposed hotel taxes.172 Attorney General Schneiderman
determined this amount by reducing Airbnb’s $500 million
revenue during the previous fiscal year by 14.75%, or the
percentage of tax that hotels in New York City face per room.173
However, until Airbnb provides full disclosure of its rentals and
income in New York City, the Attorney General’s claims can only
be speculative. 174
Non-tax-paying users represent 72% of Airbnb’s “illegal” hotel
operation (the remaining 28% of users are law abiding according to
Attorney General Schneiderman).175 Airbnb has lobbied for an
amendment to the existing Multiple Dwelling Law, which would
“classify the service as a legal hotel.”176 So far, the city has not
allowed Airbnb to break down the existing legal framework.177 The
city, however, has failed to stop the company’s rapid economic
growth, which in turn exacerbates the city’s tax collection
168 AIRBNB IN THECITY, supra note 114, at 2–3.
169 Lycoyannis, supra note 115.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
173 Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786, 790 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
2014); AIRBNB IN THECITY, supra note 114, at 7.
174 AIRBNB IN THECITY, supra note 114, at 4–5; Hamilton, supra note 31.
175 AIRBNB IN THECITY, supra note 114, at 8.
176 Hamilton, supra note 31.
177 Id.
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problem.178 Because it is unclear whether or not Airbnb is a “hotel”
for tax purposes, the city cannot solicit tax payments from Airbnb
users.179
To ease the pushback from the Attorney General’s office,
Airbnb has updated its website with additional information
regarding taxes.180 Yet it has not done this effectively, as many
users still violate tax laws.181 According to Airbnb, the burden is
on hosts to include the “proper” taxes in their rental listings and to
subsequently pay those taxes.182 Taxes are not explicitly listed
within booking rates, and hosts are given only vague guidance as
to what their responsibilities are.183 For those reasons, much is still
left unresolved.
V. PROPOSED REGULATIONS ANDCRITICISM
A. Uber
As more and more people have begun to utilize Uber, states
have initiated reforms in the hopes of prospectively mitigating
potential issues. California was among the first states to recognize
that transportation innovation had begun to outrun regulation.184
After concluding that Uber was not a traditional taxicab service,
and thus could not be regulated under longstanding taxi laws, “the
CPUC [California Public Utilities Commission] established a new
category of motor vehicle carriers, known as Transportation
178 Jennifer DePaul, AG Reports Airbnb Owes NYC Millions in Hotel
Taxes, 74 ST. TAXNOTES 131 (2014).
179 Giaquinto, supra note 113.
180 See Help Center: New York, NY, AIRBNB,
https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/868/new-york--ny (last visited Oct. 2,
2015).
181 DePaul, supra note 178.
182 Id.
183 Steven T. Jones, Airbnb Isn’t Sharing, S.F. BAY GUARDIAN ONLINE
(Mar. 19, 2013, 3:54 PM), http://www.sfbg.com/2013/03/19/airbnb-isnt-sharing
(“Hotels add the tax to the price of the room, [b]ut when you book a room on the
Airbnb site, there’s no category for local taxes and the 14 percent isn’t added to
the price.”).
184 Rayle, supra note 63, at 3.
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Network Companies,” or TNCs.185 TNCs are defined as
“operator[s] that ‘provide[] prearranged transportation services for
compensation using an online-enabled application or platform
(such as a smartphone applications) to connect drivers using their
personal vehicles with passengers.’”186 The rules require that
TNCs obtain certain insurance policies, perform background
checks on drivers, and maintain drug and alcohol policies to ensure
that drivers are law abiding.187
Although the creation of a separate category within which to
treat companies like Uber seems like a step in the right direction,
California’s efforts fail in many respects. First, the rules place the
full burden of ensuring driver compliance with CPUC regulations
on companies like Uber, that provide platforms that connect
drivers and riders.188 Second, although the law defines these
companies by placing them in their own category rather than
combining them with the existing inapplicable regulations, it fails
to include the regulations that it imposes on taxicab services that
protect the public and drivers.189 Further, without fixed pricing
standards, the company may also charge exorbitant rates in times
of high demand.190 These shortfalls demonstrate that, while the
idea of directly regulating the sharing economy seems effective,
the path that the CPUC has taken is not the best way to treat these
companies.
Colorado has also recognized the need to control ridesourcing
companies like Uber.191 The state legislature enacted Colorado
Revised Statute §40-10.1-602, a law specifically designed to
185 Id. at 4.
186 Id. (quoting Transportation Licensing, CAL. PUB. UTILITIES
COMMISSION, http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/transportationlicensing/ (last visited Oct.
2, 2015)).
187 Id. at 4.
188 See CAL. PUB. UTILITIES COMMISSION, BASIC INFORMATION FOR
TRANSPORTATION NETWORK COMPANIES AND APPLICANTS 2 (2013),
http://www.cpuc.ca.gov/NR/rdonlyres/1788F1F1-EA38-4B68-B221-4116994F2
252/0/TNC_App_Instrctns.pdf.
189 Jon Brooks, Once Friendly Territory, California Looks to Toughen
Rules for Uber, Lyft, KQED: NEWS (Jun. 17, 2014), http://ww2.kqed.org
/news/06/17/2014/Uber-Lyft-Insurance-crack-down.
190 See Kedmey, supra note 67.
191 See Rayle, supra note 63, at 4.
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regulate Transportation Network Companies (“TNCs”).192 Unlike
the California regulation, Colorado Revised Statute §40-10.1-602
explicitly details the rules and responsibilities of companies and
drivers who choose to operate under the law.193 It specifically
defines a TNC as a “corporation, partnership, sole proprietorship,
or other entity, operating in Colorado, that uses a digital network to
connect riders to drivers for the purpose of providing
transportation.”194 Further, it makes clear that a “[TNC] does not
provide taxi service, transportation service arranged through a
transportation broker, ridesharing arrangements, or any
transportation service over fixed routes at regular intervals.”195 It
further states that a TNC “is not deemed to own, control, operate,
or manage the personal vehicles used by transportation network
company drivers.”196 The law further requires certain safeguards
such as insurance and background checks, but does not address
other important issues like price gouging.197
Perhaps more effective than both the California and Colorado
laws is Washington D.C.’s “Vehicle for Hire Innovation
Amendment Act,” which creates a new class for services like
Uber.198 Setting up an entire new category solves the problem of
fitting Uber into an existing vehicle class. The Act also establishes
regulations necessary to ensure public safety and consumer
protection by enforcing background checks, inspections, and
price.199 The Act specifically states that companies cannot set
exorbitant fares, even during a state of emergency.200 Mandating
that Uber and companies like it register under the new class may
limit lawsuits and fines as operating an Uber-like vehicle is only
permitted once the vehicle and driver fully comply.201 What is also
192 COLO. REV. STAT. § 40-10.1-602 (2014).
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 Id.
196 Id.
197 Id.
198 Vehicle-for-Hire Innovation Amendment Act of 2014, D.C. CODE § 50-
303 (2014).
199 Id.
200 Id.
201 Id.
232 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY
promising about the Act is that any company that affiliates with
private vehicle-for-hire drivers would be required to create an
application process for new drivers.202 This potentially remedies
the issue of placing the burden on unapprised drivers who may not
know of any law. Further, the Act requires that all companies, like
Uber, have a website that denotes its zero tolerance policy for
drugs, alcohol, and discrimination.203 The D.C. Taxicab
Commission, however, is tasked with governing this new class of
vehicles, which turns Uber’s business model on its head.
The Washington D.C. Act best covers many of the issues that
New York faces with regard to Uber. However, the California,
Colorado, and Washington D.C. regulations do not propose the
type of regulatory regime that is imposed on ordinary taxi service
providers. This creates a gray area in which drivers and passengers
may not be protected, and leaves traditional taxicab companies to
abide by long-established laws that do not apply to Uber.
B. Airbnb
Cities have also attempted to regulate Airbnb. San Francisco
first proposed an ordinance that would prohibit illegal conduct.204
The city responded to the rise in landlords who evicted tenants in
order to convert the tenants’ apartments into short-term rentals.205
The legislation requires short-term rental services such as Airbnb
to collect the city’s 14% hotel tax.206 Residents may legally rent
their units for less than thirty days, but only if they comply with
strict regulations.207 For instance, “tenants and landlords who want
to become Airbnb hosts would need to register with the city [as
hosts] and prove they occupy the unit 75 percent of the year.”208
The city hopes that this will prevent its housing stock from turning
into illegal hotels.209 The city also believes that the ordinance will
202 Id.
203 Id.
204 S.F., Cal. Ordinance 218-14 (Oct. 21, 2014).
205 Hamilton, supra note 31, at 4.
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id.
209 Id.
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maintain the availability of affordable housing within San
Francisco.210
While this regulation does seem promising, it is inherently
flawed. Many landlords still illegally operate hotels without being
subject to the hotel occupancy tax.211 San Francisco has not
indicated how it will monitor those who are interested in operating
a short-term hotel or how it would seek out the uncompromising or
unapprised users.212 Further, the proposal does not make clear what
Airbnb’s responsibility is in terms of informing users of their
obligations.213 Airbnb currently informs users of “possible laws”
and “possible taxes” to which they may be subject in host cities.214
This does not fully protect uninformed users as it places the burden
entirely on them.
Moreover, most cities have yet to even “clarif[y] if short-term
hosts should be paying hotel taxes on their rental income” at all.215
If cities were to solicit a tax, this would indeed create the
assumption that short-term rentals are legal, a notion that has yet to
be confirmed.216 Additionally, if hosts were taxed as hotel
operators, some commentators suggest that they may be subject to
an array of other requirements.217 For instance, an abiding host
would have to comply with occupancy limits, fire precautions, and
window safety protocols.218 Many Airbnb hosts do not have the
means or the freedom to install new features to bring them into
compliance with such codes.219 Additionally, it may be quite
difficult for Airbnb rental units to be inspected by a person
210 Press Release, Mayor Lee Signs Legislation to Regulate Short-term
Residential Rentals in San Francisco (Oct. 27, 2014), http://www.sfmayor.org
/index.aspx?recordid=691&page=846.
211 See Hamilton, supra note 31.
212 S.F., Cal. Ordinance 218-14 (Oct. 21, 2014).
213 Id.
214 Terms of Service, AIRBNB, (July 6, 2015), https://www.airbnb.com
/terms.
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comparable to one who would typically inspect a hotel.220 A city
hotel’s doors are always open, permitting routine examinations.221
Hosts, however, may not wish to have surprise visits from a city
inspector, who may force his way into the apartment.222
San Francisco’s planning department has also developed a
“short-term rental website.”223 The planning department requires
that prospective Airbnb hosts register in-person by filling out an
application that includes the host’s name, the landlord’s name, a
description of the unit, and the applicable rental information.224
This approach completely absolves qualified hosts from the part of
the state’s housing law that prohibits rentals for less than thirty
days.225 This model, however, does not charge Airbnb with
registering and instead places the responsibility on users.
VI. SOLUTION FORNEWYORK
Uber and Airbnb have provided people and cities with income
and convenience. They have also raised issues of public safety and
fair business practices. New York has attempted to regulate the
sharing economy but has failed due to a lack of protection, safety,
remedies, and information.226 By classifying Uber as part of its for-
hire vehicle system, New York problematically leaves room for
Uber to price gouge, for instance, since the city cannot monitor
vehicles unaffiliated with a TLC base.227 Moreover, simply
because Uber agreed to abide by a few for-hire vehicle laws,228
does not mean that similar companies will adhere to the
regulations. Lyft, another ride sharing platform, did not at first
agree to classify its cars as for-hire vehicles, and was thus initially
220 See id.
221 Id.
222 Id.
223 See Office of Short-Term Rental Registry & FAQs, S.F. PLANNING
DEP’T (Nov. 9, 2015), http://www.sf-planning.org/index.aspx?page=4004.
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barred from operating in New York City.229 Similarly, Attorney
General Schneiderman’s efforts to penalize Airbnb users who do
not abide by existing hotel and housing regulations have met many
obstacles.230 Since the company cannot be classified as a hotel
provider, existing hotel laws do not apply to Airbnb hosts. Actions
taken to discipline users after they have unknowingly violated laws
are ineffective. Hence, a more preventative approach is necessary.
Moreover, the idea of leaving it up to Uber and Airbnb to
inform users of potential legal ramifications nearly absolves the
companies from all liability. It also mandates users to educate
themselves. 231 Users will likely be unable to fully understand the
laws, assuming the laws even apply. Likewise, third parties, such
as pedestrians who do not use Uber, as well as neighbors of Airbnb
hosts, should be protected from the risks associated with these
businesses. Without set rules apprising users, respecting
incumbents, and ensuring safety amongst third parties, problems
with the sharing economy will continue.
New York City should therefore create laws for these
businesses and for the sharing economy as a whole. The city can
follow the lead of places like Washington D.C., California, and
Colorado, but a comprehensive and effective regulatory regime
will require it to go further.232 First, amending existing regulations
to permit sharing economy businesses to operate is ineffective
because as new companies enter the market, laws will have to
continuously be amended. Second, attempting to fit sharing
economy companies into already standing laws is also not practical
for the same reasons. For example, Feastly, a company that allows
users to share meals with others, has recently entered New York
City’s sharing economy market.233 Residents of New York City
229 Joshua Brustein, While Uber Thrives in New York, Its Competitors
Lobby Regulators, BLOOMBERG (Jun. 2, 2014), http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/
articles/2014-06-02/while-uber-thrives-in-new-york-its-competitors-battle-
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230 See Airbnb, Inc. v. Schneiderman, 989 N.Y.S.2d 786, 792 (2014).
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“platforms,” expect users to understand risks).
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who enjoy cooking can advertise home-cooked meals through
Feastly and interested eaters can choose to dine at their homes.234
Despite Feastly’s success,235 issues could arise such as whether or
not users can serve alcohol, or whether or not certain sanitary
conditions are met. Attempting to fit Feastly into existing
restaurant regulations or to amend existing restaurant law to
accommodate Feastly would prove unworkable as Feastly merely
connects people through a technological platform, and is not a
restaurant.236 Amending existing industry regulations for each new
sharing economy business like Feastly is ultimately both inefficient
and ineffective. The New York City legislature should use
Colorado’s SB 125, Washington D.C.’s Act, and the San Francisco
short-term rental website, as a framework to develop a scheme that
would be comprehensive enough to regulate myriad sharing
economy practices to keep up with its rapidly growing nature.
These initiatives provide a logical starting point from which
New York City could begin to develop its own regulatory regime.
First, the Colorado law set a precedent for legislatively sanctioning
a sharing economy practice.237 This ultimately gives the people a
voice and grants the government the power to oversee the
operation of these businesses. The Washington D.C. Act’s creating
a new class of “services”238 eliminates the need to find a place for
sharing economy businesses within existing laws. The D.C. Act
also places the burden on businesses like Uber to apprise users of
potential legal issues.239 San Francisco’s short-term rental website
(“Launched in private beta in January [2014], [Feastly] has seen three-quarters
of all cooks host multiple meals. The cost of meals has ranged from free to
$150, but the average price tends to be about $35, according to co-founder Noah
Karesh. Some chefs have already made thousands of dollars using the platform,
even in private beta mode.”).
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puts the city on notice as to who is utilizing Airbnb’s services.240
This prevents city officials from searching for and attacking the
users who violate the law.241 Although none of these laws are
perfect, together they provide a useful starting point for New York
City to develop its own regulatory scheme.
New York City’s law should first rely on the principles upon
which the sharing economy is based. Specifically, the law should
safeguard the direct exchange of goods and services between
individuals who utilize a technological platform to facilitate this
exchange.242 The law should define the term “sharing economy”
broadly to encompass many sharing practices such as ridesharing
and apartment sharing. Companies that fall under the sharing
economy umbrella, as established by the city legislature, would
then be subject to rules pertaining to their particular class. The law
should first apply tailored rules to established sharing economy
business models, like ridesharing and apartment sharing. The law
could then develop for new and emerging businesses like Feastly,
which present a need for unique regulation. A tailored approach
reflects the reality that different sharing economy businesses,
although part of the sharing economy, present different regulatory
challenges.
Until now, cities and states have dealt with this reality poorly.
New York City’s TLC cannot directly monitor Uber.243 Uber
agreed to have drivers license their vehicles and obtain TLC
insurance but they still do not require background checks and can
still discriminate and price gouge.244 By creating a regulatory
regime specifically for ridesharing companies, the city would
mandate Uber to have its drivers register as a “ridesharing
company.” The city could still mandate that Uber register with the
TLC.245 The new law would only add further rules and
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specifications to Uber’s operating in New York City. Similar to the
Washington D.C. Act, rules for discrimination would be
provided,246 and, in order to operate, drivers would have to agree to
the terms.247 This would ensure public safety and consumer
protection. Users and third parties could remain confident that the
new regime would protect them from unfair and unsafe business
practices.
The same is true with respect to Airbnb. The 2010 amendment
to the Multiple Dwelling Law sought to permit rentals of certain
types of dwellings, to provide individuals with extra income, while
preventing entire buildings from being turned into illegal hotels.248
The law attempts to protect guests since residential apartments
generally do not contain the safety precautions found in a hotel.249
However, hotels are stringently regulated because they do provide
services.250 Hosts who rent out their space through Airbnb do not
provide the services that hotels offer. Therefore, an apartment
sharing regulatory regime would require prospective Airbnb hosts
to register their apartment prior to having a guest to ensure that
they have met sufficient safety standards. The city will then be on
notice as to which apartments are utilizing Airbnb’s services and
for what period. Most importantly, Airbnb users will not be
unknowingly subject to a violation of the Multiple Dwelling Law,
as the law will not apply to them.
A sharing economy-specific law also better protects users, third
parties, and incumbent industries. To protect users, the New York
City law should mandate that each sharing economy business post
the law on its website, in its entirety, and in clear and
understandable terms so as to notify individuals of all their legal
responsibilities. A set standard would also protect third parties and
incumbents by preventing unnecessary lawsuits and fines. If users
comply with the New York City law, there would be fewer reasons
for lawsuits. Third parties, incumbents, and frustrated city and
government officials would no longer be burdened with solving the
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problem of how to define these businesses and which laws apply to
them. Instead, qualified businesses would fall under the sharing
economy umbrella covered by the new law.
CONCLUSION
The time has come for New York City to stop denouncing
sharing while thousands of individuals do so every day. In order to
promote innovation and the growth of new and novel businesses,
New York City should stop halting the spread of the sharing
economy. The legislature should recognize the viability of this
practice instead of attempting to circumvent it. Since neither Uber
nor Airbnb can neatly fit into any existing industry regulations, the
city should create sharing economy-specific laws. The laws must
be comprehensive enough to encompass the different types of
sharing economy businesses and to cover similar legal issues that
the existing industry standards protect against. If New York fails to
act, the sharing economy will still prosper, and the city will
appropriately be “The Big Apple” that does not give anyone a bite.
